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THE ECONOMICSOF PRICE SCISSORS
ABSTRACT
We analyze consequences of changing the terms of trade between
agriculture and industry on capital accumulation and on welfare of
workers in different sectors. The issue was central to Soviet indus-
trialization debate and it remains important in today's developing
world. Through a simple general equilibrium model, we show that a
price squeeze on peasants increases accumulation (as Preobrazhensky
argued), but it makes both urban and rural workers worse—off (con-
trary to Preobrazhensky's contention). The desirable changes in terms
of trade are shown to depend on intertemporal valuations, but, within
a range, not on rural—urban welfare trade—off. Our characterization
ofthe optimal terms of trade is remarkably simple, in which the role
of welfare weights and of relevant empirical parameters are easily
ascertained.We then extend our analysis to economies with labor mo-
bility and unemployment and, using a simple model with rigid industrial
wage, show that the optimal terms of trade entail a tax on urban sector,
a subsidy to rural sector, and a level of urban employment such that the
urban wage exceeds the marginal product of urban worker.
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An important policy issue facing many developing countries is that of the
appropriate terms of trade between the industrial and the agricultural
sectors. Traditionally, this problem has been known as the 'scissors
problem', and it has been typically discussed in the context of a socialist
society striving f or capital accumulation in the early phase of economic
development.1 Changing the terms of trade has distributional consequences as
well. We examine here both the accumulation and the distribution aspects
simultaneously.
Ouranalysisis based upon a simple general equilibrium model of a dual
economy, in which the role of incentives in the rural sector is emphasized.
Using this model, we describe the effects of altering the terms of trade on
the members of the rural and the urban sectors, and on the state's surplus.
We then extend our analysis to obtain normative results, such as: under what
conditions will a change in the terms of trade unequivocally benefit a
society; and what is the nature of the optimal terms of trade?
The issues being examined in the present paper are of considerable
historical as well as contemporary significance. One of the central concerns
of the classical economists was the relative roles of the town and the country
in the early phases of economic growth. Probably the best known landmark of
this interest was the lively controversy between Thomas Maithus and David
Ricardo on the corn laws. These concerns were also recognized, but side—
—1—stepped, by KarlMarx2.
Thetown—versus—country questions emerged as pivotal, however, on the eve
of the October Revolution; so muchsothat every important Soviet leader had
to grapple with it.3 Furthermore, the economic events of the early 1920's
were so severe [see Dobb (1966, chapter 7)] that the state's policy on the
terms of trade becamearaging controversy in the ensuing debate on Soviet
industrialization. A seminalparticipantin this debate was Evgeny
Preobrazhensky (1965) whoproposedthat the state can, and should, increase
its surplus by turning the terms of trade against peasants.4 This policy of
'primitive accumulation' was challenged on a number of different grounds by
many members of the Soviet leadership (see Erlich (1960)]. What interests us
here about the Soviet debate is that some of our results clarify and correct
certaincrucial elements of this debate.
Even though the discussions within the USSR itself had subsided with the
institutionof Joseph Stalin's collectivization policy, the town—versus—
country problems have remained important in recent decades in many socialist
countries, for example in Eastern Europe and in the People's Republic of
China. Specfcally, the pastattempts of several socialist economies to
achieve a direct control of the agricultural sector have not been particularly
successful, and these experiences in turn have added a greater relevance to
theexamination of indirect control mechanisms, as for example, through price
incentives.
-
Similarconsiderations are relevant in developing economies. In fact, in
a typièal developing economy, not only does the government have fewer
instrumentsofcontrol, but also the agricultural sector plays a re
important role in determining national output and employment.Itis not
surprising therefore that the issue ofintersectoral pricing is a central
—2—aspect of policy making in many developing economies.5 The research on these
issues, however, has been surprisingly inadequate.6 In particular, an
analytical examination of the scissors problem has been hitherto lacking, and
the present paper is intended to fill this lacuna.
The plan of the paper is as follows. The basic model of the economy is
presented in Section I. Descriptive analysis is conducted in Sections II and
III. The analysis of normative questions is then taken up. Results on the
desirable reforms in the terms of trade are presented in Section IV, and the
optimal tax and the optimal terms of trade are discussed in Section V. The
model is then extended in Section VI to incorporate labor mobility and
unemployment. Section VII contains some comments on the Soviet
industrialization debate. Certain extensions of the present analysis are
discussed in Section VIII, and conclusions are presented at the end of the
paper.
I.THE MODEL
The rural sector's population Is N', and A is the-total agricultural land
area which is owned within the rural sector. Intra—sectoral distribution is
ignored, and a A/N' is the land area per worker. Li denotes the hours
worked by each worker. The production technology exhibits constant returns to
scale.X X(A/N, L1)X(a, L) is the output per worker. A rural
worker's consumption of the rural and the urban good Is denoted by (x1, y).
The surplus of the rural good per worker, Q, is given by
(1) Q"X—x'
The relative price of the rural good in terms of the urban good is denoted by
—3—p. A rural worker's budget constraint becomes
(2) pQ"y1
A rural worker's utility is represented by U'U(x', y', L1). The
indirect utility is obtained from
1 1 111 1 1 1 1 1
(3) V(p,N) maxU(x,y,L)+'[pX(A/N,L)px —yl
x ,y ,L
From the envelope theorem
(4) X1Q > 0,and --— AIpXaa/Nl< 0
where Xa —-, and is the (positive) marginal utility of income in sector
i. It is evident that the rural surplus is a function of the relative price
and the ruralpopulation,i.e., QQ(p,N1). It is also worth keeping in
mind that, in our notation, an increase in the size of price scissors, i.e.,
an increase in the relative price of the urban good, corresponds to a decrease
inp.
The urban population is N2, and an urban worker supplies hours of work
which are fixed by the government, based on technological considerations. The
urban worker's consumption of the rural and the urban good is denoted by(x2,
y2), and w is the wage per hour, in terms of the industrial good. The budget
constraint of an urban worker is given by
(5) px +y -wL
—4—Denoting the urban individual's utility function by U2U(x2, y2, L2), the
indirect utility is obtained from7
2 222 22 2 2
(6) V(p, w) maxU(x ,y ,L)+ A[wL px —yl
x ,y
The envelope theorem yields
(7) >O,and <0
Naturally, the urban consumption is a function of the relative price and the
urban wage, i.e., x2.x2(p, w). The consumption goods are assumed to be
normal.The output of anurban worker is denoted by Y Y(k, L2), where k —
K/N2is capital stock per urban worker, and Kis the totalurban capital
stock.
The economy under consideration is a closed economy.8 The sectoral
populations are fixed. The total population is N, and
(8) N—N'+N2
The rural quantities can not be controlled directly, but theycanbe
influenced indirectly through the termsoftrade, p. The urban sector is
somewhat ure controllable, in that the urban wage can be changed by the
government.9
The two basic constraints in the economy are the quantity balances of the
urban and the rural goods respectively. Defining I as the state's surplus of
the urban good, ihave
—5—22211 (9) INY—Ny —Ny ,andI—K
That is,the urban output is used either for consumption or for investment.




Finally, note that the above model can be easily expanded to include the
possibility of investing the urban capital good in the rural sector. We
ignore this aspect because the focus of the present paper is on the analysis
of the terms of trade. This analysis in any case remains essentially
unchanged, as we will see later, if the investment allocation decision is
incorporated.
With the features of the economy described above, we cannowbegin the
analysis of the terms of trade. The next two sections trace the impact of
altering the terms of trade on the basic economic variables. Interestingly
enough, six decades ago, Preobrazhensky had presented certain important
propositions on these matters. Ourdescriptiveanalysis ascertains the
conditions under which Preobrazhensky's propositions are valid.
II. PREOBRAZHENSKY'S FIRST PROPOSITION
Preobrazhensky's most important claim was that the state canincrease
accumulation by moving the terms of trade against peasants, i.e., by
increasing the size of scissors. For ease of reference, we call this
Preobrazhensky's first proposition. Naturally, this proposition is quite
basic, because it asserts the feasibility of using the terms of trade as an
—6—instrument for society's accumulation.
Recall that moving the terms of trade against peasnts means a decrease
in p. The above proposition thus says: < 0. To examine the conditions
under which this proposition holds, we obtain an alternative expression for
the state's surplus. Substitution of (2), (5), and (10) in (9) yields
(11) I —N2(Y—vL2)
The state's surplus is therefore the difference between the urban output and
the wage payment to the urban workers, and the surplus does not directly
depend on the terms of trade, p.
A change in p, however, requires a change in the urban wage, w, if the
demand and supply balance of the ruralgood,(10), is to be preserved. To
obtain the relation between p and w, we first define some notations. m wL2





arerespectively, the price elasticity of the rural surplus, the price
elasticity of the urban consumption of the rural good, and the income
elasticity of the urban consumption of the rural good. Finally define
as the percent change in the urban wage which must accompany a percent
increase in p. That is
(13) C
wp






The change in the state's surplus due to a change in the terms of trade is





In the above expression, the sign of the rural surplus response,
isnot predictable theoretically because this response is a composite of the
production response, the consumption response and the labor supply response.
Fortunately, however, several sources of empirical evidence already exist on
this subject. Amongthemare: (i) analysis of rural surplus in theSoviet
Union during the 1920's (Dobb (1966, Chapter 7)], (ii) econometric studies of
economy—wide supply response of different crops in many countries, following
an early work by Behrman (1968), arid (iii) inicroeconometric studies of farm—
household behavior [Lau, Lin andYotopoulos(1978), and BarnumandSquire
(1979)]. Allofthese studies indicate a positive surplus response to
price. Based on this evidence, we maintain throughout the paper that
(16)
Now, looking at the right side of (15), and are positive
because consumption goods are normal. Using (16), therefore, < 0. [In
fact, the same result will hold even ifC'isnegative within some range]




Wetherefore conclude that: Preobrazensky's first propositionis valid,
i.e. ,turningthe terms of trade against peasants leads to anincreased
accumulation. Also that: turning theterms of trade against peasants leads
to a larger increase in accumulationif the price response of the rural
surplus is larger.
The above results need to be contrasted withthe assertion made by
several authors that increasing the squeeze on farmersthrough the price
scissors may not lead to accumulation if therural surplus is highly price
responsive [for example, Lipton (1977, p.129—130) and Mitra (1977, p. 54)1.
As shown above, not only is this not correct,but quite the opposite is true!
Themainpoint missed by earlier researchersis the distinction between
therural surplus andthestate's surplus, andthedistinction between the
state'ssurplus and the consumption of industrialworkers. Surely, a decrease
in the relative price of the rural goodwill lead to a lower rural surplus, if
the price response of the rural surplus is higher.This in turn will require
a higher decrease in the urbandemand of the rural good, and the only way in
which it can be accomplished is if a higherdecrease in the urban real wage is
enforced by the government. This higher decreasein the urban wage will then
naturally lead to a higher state's surplus.
III. PREOBRAZHENSKY'S SECOND PROPOSITION
The economic content of another importantclaim of PreobrazhenskY can be
expressed as follows: by turningthe terms of trade against peasants, itis
possible to accumulate in a mannerthat the economic position of industrial
workers will notdeteriorate.'0
dV2
This proposition can be expressed in ournotation as: (0.From the
—9—earlier analysis, it is clear that there aretwo effects on an urban worker of
changing the terms of trade: a direct priceeffect, and an indirect effect due




SubstitutiOn of (7) in the above yields
, dV2 22 wL2
18)——x [—x+c
dp pwp
We define c— 23.asthe urban budget share of the rural good,and
2u —— PXasthe price elasticity of the compensateddemand for the
rural good in the urban sector. Usingthese definitions, the Slutsky
expression can be written as
2 2u22
(19) c —c +ae
xpxp x
-




In the above expression, 0 from the standard Slutsky propertyof
compensated demand. it followsfrom (16) and (20) that dV2> 0 •Alsonote
1 dV2 dp
that a higher c, corresponds to ahigher —.
Thereforethe welfare of industrial workersmust decline if the state
accumulates by turning the terms oftrade against peasants. Preobrazhensky'S
secondproposition is thereforeinvalid. Also: turning the termsof trade
—10—against peasants leads to a larger decline in the welfare of industrial
workers if the price response of the rural surplus is larg.
The crucial point missed by Preobrazhensky and subsequent researchers is
the constraint generated by the demand and supply balance of the rural
good.1' This constraint, (10), dictates the feasible combinations of the
terms of trade and the urban wage and, hence, it determines the feasible (as
well as the necessary) change in the urbanwagecorresponding to any change in
the terms of trade.12 This in turndeterminesthe effect of a change in the
terms of trade on the state's surplus as well as on the welfare of urban
workers.
To recapitulate, we have shown that turning the terms of trade against
the ruralsectorleads to an increase in the state's surplus according to
(15), and that it leads to a decrease in the welfare of urban workers
according to (20). Finally, the effect of the terms of trade on therural
sector's welfare is given directly by (4). As one would expect, the peasants
experience a decrease in welfare if the price ratio is turned againstthem.
These three effects are now put together for normative analysis, which is
conducted in the next two sections.
IV. REFORM IN TUE TERMS OF TRADE
Theaim ofa policy reform analysis isto identify rules for an improve-
mentin society's overall welfare. Naturally anysuchrule ismoreuseful if
less information is required to applyit.The results in this section are
particularly significant from this point of view because, as weshall see,
their application requires quite minimalinformation.
The first step in the analysis of reform is to def Inc the aggregate
social welfare. For this, we use an additive Bergson—Samuelsonsocial welfare
—1k—function,1, to aggregate over individual utilities.
(21) —N1W(V1)+N2W(V2)
where W is concave and increasing in V. If 6 iE thesocial value of the
marginalinvestment, then the current value of the aggregate social welfare,
II, is given by
(22)R '1'+ 6i
Substituting (11) in (22)
(23) H —N1W(V'(p,N1)) + N2W(V2(p, v)) + —wL2
Theabove expression is now perturbed with respect to p, while ensuring a





—N'8'Q+ N282( x2 +! c —Q C
pwp p
where -—is the social value of a marginal increasein the income of
aworker in sector i. The three terms on the right band side of (24)
represent, respectively, thewelfare gain to the ruralsector, the welfare
gainto the urban sector, and the loss of investment due to an increase in the
relative price of the ruralgood.Naturally, these gains and losses are
—12—weighed by their respective social weights.
Using (10), and the definition of the budget share, (X,(24)can be
expressed as
(25) —N2x(1— +N2x2(2 —5)J2
Note that the above expression clearly separates the two distinct effects of a
change in the relative price. The first term is the direct effect of an
increase in the relative price of the rural good, which benefits the peasants
but hurts the urban workers. The second term is the net effect of the induced
increase in the urban wage, which benefits the urban workers but reduces the
investment fund.
The expression (25) can now be used to obtain the rules for reform in the
terms of trade, i.e., the sufficient conditions which will guarantee that a
specific change in the relative price will increase the social welfare.
Rewriting (25), we obtain
(26) dR N2x2[(1—6)+ (2 —5) 1)1
Nextnote from (19) thatC2/cL2C2 >1, becauseC211 > 0. Further, as xp x— xp-
> 0,it follows from (14) that
(27) C
wpx
Substitution of the above in (26) yields the following two rules for ;:.forms
(28) < 0, if￿'and2 (with at least one strict inequality),
—13—and
(29) > 0, if 816 and 826 (with at leastone strict inequality)
From (28) and (29),wefind that: moving the terms of tradeagainst (in
favor of) peasants is desirable if the socialweight on investment is greater
(smaller) than the social weights on rural and urbanincome, Note that this
rule holds no matter which one of the two socialweights on income is
larger. The reason for this is quite simple. If the social valuationof a
dollar of investment exceeds the social valuation ofa dollar of consumption
(in both sectors), then the gains from moving theprices against peasants
exceed the losses .due to decreased consumption,regardless of which one of the
two sets of workers is worse—off.
What is important about these rules is that theiruse does not require
the knowledge of the behavioral parameters (suchas the rural surplus
response, and the urban consumption response). Our rules can be used solely
on the basis of the social weights 'in the existing regime,i.e., the social
weIghts associated with a dollar of rural and urban income versusa dollar of
investment. The simplicity of these rules is quite unlike theresults which
one typically finds in the public finance literature [see Atkinson and
Stiglitz (1980, p. 382—386) for a recent review of this material].
The procedure for moving the termsoftrade in the desirable direction
can now be examined. Suppose we are in an initial regime in which the social
weight on investment exceeds the two social weights on income. Then, from
(28) the relative price of the rural good,p, should be decreased. A decrease
in p, from (4) and (20), will decrease the individualutilities, V and
but, on the other hand, it will increase the investment I, due to (15). The
—14—social weightsonincome, and willin turn increasesince individuals
now have lower levels of utility.'3 In contrast, it is natural toexpect that
thedecreasein p will lead to a decrease in the social weight oninvestment,
6, because the investment has become larger.
Thus, after every small decrease in the relative price, we need to
compare 8',2,and6•Theprice decrease should be continued until that
point when the larger of the two social weights on incomes becomesequal to
the social weight on investment. Once this equalityarises, any finite
decrease in p will violate (28). Thus, we can no longeruse the rules of
reform, and additional information is needed to facilitate furtherpolicy
making. Essentially the same line of reasoning applies for an increase in the
relative price if we are in an initial regime in which the socialweight on
investment is smaller than bothofthe social weights on income, i.e., when
(29) holds.
A final point needs to be emphasized here. The above analysisclearly
shows that, over a range of social weights, the decision to widenor to narrow
the price scissors is independent of the comparison between rural and urban
welf are, Instead, this decision depends on the intertemporalcomparison
between consumption and investment.
V. OPTIMT}1TERMS OFTRADE
We are already in a position to recognize some features of the optimal
price structure. Assuming that a unique interior maximum exists for our
maximization problem, weshouldhave 0atthe optimum.The necessary
conditionsfor this characteristic of the optimum can be extracted from (28)
and (29). We find that the optimal. price structure must satisfy14
—15-(30) 1>6>2,or2>6>1.
In other words, if the social weight on investment does not lie between
the social weights on the rural and the urban income then the regime is not
optimal, and it can be improved through price policy. This result needs to
contrasted with a view often held in the literature on project evaluation that
the social weight on investment should be higher than the (undifferentiated)
social weight on consumption [Yotopoulos and Nugent (1976, p. 385), f or
example1.Thisview is incorrect if the terms of trade can be used as an
instrumentof policy.
Before analyzing the optimal term of trade, we take up the question of
taxation in the present policy problem. Therecent literature on optimal tax
theory suggests that nreinsights canoftenbe obtained by comparing market
priceswith shadow prices, rather than by comparing producer and consumer
prices [Stiglitz and Dasgupta (1971)]. This is specially relevant here since
producer and consumer prices are identical. In fact, a rural worker is
simultaneously a producer and a consumer.
We therefore define "tax" ("subsidy") as the difference between the
consumer (producer) price and the social opportunity cost of producing the
sa good. If flisthe shadow price of the rural good, then the shadow price
of the rural good in terms of the urban good is ft 6•The subsidy rate
therefore is defined as s —(p—n/6)/p.An interesting feature of the
present problem is that the same price regime will mean a subsidy to one
sector and a tax on another sector. Take an example. If s > 0 then the urban
sector is paying a tax, while the rural sector is receiving a subsidy.
To obtain the optimal tax formula, the following Lagrangian is defined by
explicitly incorporating the rural .good constraint, (10), into the maximand
—16--(31) Z '1' + ó[N2Y —N2y2—N'y']+ nEN1Q —N2x2]
where 'isgiven by (21), and p and w are the control variables.15 The first
order conditions with respect to p and w, after some manipulation'6, can be
written as




Equations (33) and (34) are alternative expressions for the optimal
subsidy rate, and these can be easily interpreted. Note from (32) that s is
positive or negative depending on whether is greater than or smaller than
A higher ,onthe other hand, corresponds to a lower level of utility
[see footnote 13]. The expression (32), therefore, clearly demarcates the
location of the optima]. tax (or subsidy) between the two sectors: the workers
who are better—off should be taxed, while the workers who are worse—off should
be- subsidized. This result is independent of the behavioral responses in the
economy, of the social valuation of investment, and of whether the peasants or
the industrial worker3 are better—off. Note, however, that the magnitude of
subsidy does depend on the social weight on investment.
The influence of the rural surplus response on subsidy can be partly
understood in the following manner. For a moment, assume that the social
weights are constants. Then, a higher meansthatan increase in the
price p leads to a higher loss (gain) to the government if p exceeds (is less
than)ui/6, The government, therefore, would want to keep a-lower absolute
—17—value of the rate of subsidy, as (32) indicates. This explanation, however,
isonly partial because our formulae for an optimum do not provide a. closed
form solution for the rate of subsidy.
The formula for the optimal price is easily obtained by equating the
right hand sides of (32) and(33),and using (14).
2 1 2 2 6 2 (34)px(" —)—wL( —8)c
Theabove expression equates the net social gain from a price increase to the
netsocial 1088 due to the price—induced wage increase. Rearranging the terms





AlternativeCharacterizations: In the above analysis we have employed
the terms of trade as the instrument of control. This we have done to keep
the analysis within the context of the tecissors problem'. There are several
alternative ways, however, in which the present problem can be characterized.
First, consider the control of the nominal price of the urban good or the
nominal urbanwage, because it isthrough these variables that a terms of
tradepolicy can actually be implemented. It can be verified that an increase
in the nominal price of the urban good corresponds to a movement in the terms
of trade againstthe ruralsector, and that an increase in thenominal urban
wagecorresponds to a movement in the terms of trade in favor of the rural
sector. Either one of these two nominal variables can therefore be used as
the instrument of control, without affecting the results.
Second, the economic content of the analysis remains unchanged if either
—18—the level of investment, 1, or the rural surplus, Q, is used as the
independent policy instrument. In these cases the analysis will correspond to
what is sometimes called the 'investment problem', and the 'marketed surplus'
problem.
Third, our conclusions regarding the terms of trade remain essentially
unaltered if the "modern" capital good produced in the urban sector can be
productively employed in the rural sector, and if the government exercises the
choice over the intersectoral allocation of investment. As a simple example,
consider the case in which there is positive investment in both sectors and
the renton therural capital accrues to the ruralsector.Then it can be
verifiedthatpricingrules, (32) to (35) continue to characterize the
optimum.Similarly, our qualitative results on the terms oftrade will not
changeif a time dependent process of technical progress in production is
incorporated in the model.
Finally, we can reinterpret our analysis in a decentralized economic
setting. To see this, first imagine that the government instructs its public
sector managers to maximize profits based on the nominal prices they face, but
introduces either a commodity tax on the urban good or a wage tax. Naturally,
then,the government can control the terms of trade at any level that it
desires.In particular, the optimum which we have analyzed earlier, is
implementable in this manner. Next, assume that the industrial production is
privately owned, but that the government imposes a 100Zprofittax, andthat
italso imposes one of the two taxes mentioned above. It follows that the
desired public policy can be implemented through a private market
equilibrium.
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—19--VI. UNtPLO'!MENT MD LABOR MOBILITY IN DEVELOPING ECON4IES
Many developing economies are characterised by significant unemployment
aswell asby endogenous mobility of labor between rural andurban sectors.
Itis then necessary that the design of pricingpolicy in such economies
shouldtake into account its influenceonlabor mobility and unemployment.18
Inthis section, therefore, we extend our basicmodel to include these
additionalaspects.
The population is now divided into three groups, consisting of employed
rural workers, employed urban workers, and unemployed workers. Their
utilities are represented by V'(p, N'), V2(p, w), and V,andtheir
populations are denoted by N', N2, and Nu respectively. For simplicity, the
present analysis abstracts from transfer arrangements from the employed to the
unemployed workers, and assumes that the unemployed workers have zero income.
We posit that the mobility of labor across different groups of workers
can be described through a reduced form equation
(36) N'N'(p, w, N2)
which gives the rural. populationasa function of the relative price, the
urban wage and urban employment. It follows then that the level of unemploy-
ment can be obtained as a function of same variables, since
(37) N=Nl+N2+NU
Note that our representation of labor mobility is quite general. Specific
hypotheses concerning migration which have been proposed in the literature,
e.g., the Rarris—Todaro hypothesis [Harris and Todaro (1970)1, can be treated
—20—as special casesofthe above.
Next, one needs to specify the determination of the urban wage. A number
of alternative theories have been proposed in the literature [see Stiglitz
(1982a, 1982b)J, and it is possible to examine the correct pricing policy for
each of these theories of urban wage determination [see Sah and Stiglitz
(1983a) for such an approach]. For brevity, however, we follow here a simple
hypothesis, according to which the urban wage is fixed, and the urban
employment is controlled by the government. This representation of what the
government can control in a developing economy conforms to the understanding
that the urban wage is institutionally determined and also that much of the
urban employment is in the public sector, over which the government exercises
some control.
Note, however, that the two policy variables, p and N2, can not be
controlled independently in the present problem. This is because a given
combination of (p, N2) determines a level of N' through (36), and the
resulting set of variables can not in general be expected to satisfy the
quantity balance of the rural good, (10).
For later use, we define the following elasticities. Based on (36),
tnN LnN'
(38) N = ,andM p 3Lnp e
are the elasticities of the rural population with respect to the relative
price and the urban employment respectively. a — isthe elasticity of
rural surplus per rural worker with respect to land per rural worker.
Finally, —3LQ)
is elasticity of total rural surplus with respect to
its price. It is easy to verify that
—21—(39) — +(1 —
£a)Mp
The relevant Lagrangian is defined by (31) in which
(40) N1W(V1) + N2w(v2) + (N —N1—N2)W(Vt1)
The first order conditions with respect to p and N2 can be obtained easily.
For brevity, we present and interpret only the first order condition with
respect to p, which after making subsitutions which are similar to those








Note immediately that (41) reduces to (32) if—0.Thisis precisely what
wewould expect. If themarginal,migration is zero then the rule for optimal
pricing withendogenous migration is the same as the one in which populations
are fixed.
The additional effects introduced by labor mobility can be understood
intuitively by comparing (41) with (32). First note that the rural surplus
response in the denominator of (41) is now redefined, according to (39), to
include the effect of price on the size of rural population. Second, from
(42), •isthe gain in the social welfare if one unemployed worker becomes
employed in the rural sector. This includes the direct gain,W(V1) —
andthe indirect loss, 8'pXaa, due to the increased congestion on the rural
land. The term containing in (41), therefore, represents the welfare gain
—22—from the price induced labor bility.
In the rest of this section, we provide a specific illustration of the
above approach in which the migration is described by the Harris—Todaro
hypothesis. According to this hypothesis, the unemployed workers are in the
urban sector, and the probability that a migrant worker from the rural sector
finds employment in the urban sector is N2/(N —N1).The sectoral populations
are determined by the equalization o& the rural utility to the expected urban
utility. That is, the expression (36)is specialized to
(43) (N —N1)V'—N2V2+(N—N1—N2)VU
To ensure that NU remains positive, it is explicitly assumed that
v2 > V1 > V". Thisnaturally restricts the range of pricewithin which the
above hypothesis is meaningful. In addition, we make the following
simplifying assumptions: (i) the rural land is not too scarce, i. e., Xa and
are negligible in magnitude, and (ii) the social welfare function is
utilitarian, i.e., W(V) —V,and B A. Because of the second assumption,
our results do not depend on whether the social welfare function is defined
over the ex ante or the ex post utilities of workers.
By perturbaing (43) withrespectto p and N2, we find -that
(44) > 0, and N < 0
A result follows immediately. An increase (decrease) in the price of
agricultural output will be accompanied by an increase (decrease) in
industrial employment. This can be seen as follows. An increase in p
increases the total rural surplus because > 0, from (39) and (44). Also,
—23—an increaseinp decreasesthe urban demand for the rural good. As a result,
therewill be an oversupply of the rural good. An increase in the urban
employment will therefore be necessary to achIeve abalance between the demand
andsupply of the rural good.








There are two results to be noted. First, s > 0 from (45). Therefore,
the optimal terms of trade will entail a subsidy to peasants and a tax on
industrial workers.
Second, the optimal terms of trade will entail a level of industrial
employment such that the industrial wage will exceed the marginal product of
an industrial worker. This follows from (44), (46), and s > 0. The idea
behind this result is quite intuitive. The society in the present case is
concerned only with the rural utility because this utility is the same as the
expected utility of other workers.An. increase in the rural price therefore
raises the social welfare associated with consumption. From an earlier
result, on the other hand, a higher rural price will be accompanied by an
increase in the urban employment. The contribution of an additional urban
worker to investment is —w)L2,which declines as urban employment
increases because of the declining marginal product. The optimal terms of
—24—VII. CfMENTS ON THE SOVIET DEBATE
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trade will thus involve a trade—off between a gain in consumption and a loss
in investment. The latter obviously implies that < w.
A significant shortcoming of the Soviet debate was the lack of attention
given to the behavioral responses of peasants. This is especially surprising
since the economic events faced by the early Soviet state (Dobb (1966, Chapter
7)], as veil as Vladimir Lenin's warnings'9, had already pointed out the
importance of incentives. Be that as it may, we have clearly demonstrated
that the behavioral responses of peasants are central to any analysis of the
scissors problem.
On the specific effects of turning the prices against peasants, we find
that the government can indeed increase the rate of accumulation by imposing a
price squeeze on peasants. This effect was originally claimed by
Preobrazhensky, and his claim is valid, despite the doubts raised by
subsequent researchers. But, the other important proposition made by
Preobrazhensky, that the price squeeze can be operated without hurting the
industrial proletariat, is invalid. A price squeeze on peasants will hurt the
industrial proletariat, just as it will hurt the peasants,
It is of some interest to note here that much of the criticism faced
Preobrazhenskyinthe Soviet debate was that he was anti—peasant. "They
accusedhim of,favoring the 'exploitation' of the peasants, of advocating a
kind of internal colonialism" [Nove (1965, p. xi)]. In fact, Preobrazhensky
himself devoted much of his energies to trying to prove that he was not as
anti—peasant as his book might have suggested at first [see his reply to
Nikolai Bukharin and other opponents, in Preobrazhensky (1965, Appendix)].
Some of this criticism might have been avoided, we suspect, had he not claimed(incorrectly, as demonstrated by our analysis) that the industrial proletariat
would not have to pay any price for the state's ac.umulation.
Our analysis has also shown that the determination of the correct "tax
level or the correct size of the scissors depends on the social valuation of
the welfare of the peasants and the industrial proletariat, as compared to the
social valuation of investment [see equations (32) to (35)]. On this score,
it has often been believed that the peasants' welfare was irrelevant to the
early Soviet state. Probably a better interpretation of the pre—
collectivization debates might be that Preobrazhensky represented the lower
end of the concern for the peasants, in contrast to Lenin who represented the
middle position,2° and to Bukharin who represented the higher end of the
concern for the peasants.2' On the other hand, it appears that the early
Soviet leadership was fairly unanimous in placing a higher social weight on
investment as compared to consumption, and in placing a higher social weight
on the consumption of the industrial proletariat as compared to the
consumption of the peasants.
22
For this interpretation of the initial Soviet situation, our analysis
shows that a movement in the terms of trade against peasants emerges as
desirable, at least to that point where investment and the consumption of
industrial protetariat have the sams social weight [see (28)1. The direction
of change in the terms of trade, therefore, remains the same even though the
relative concern for peasants might differ! The level of tax to be imposed on
peasants, on the other hand, will differ according to the social concern for
them: a higher concern will correspond to a lower tax [see (32)].
—26—VIII. EXTENSIONS
Thereare twoimportantaspects of a model of policy analysis such as the
present one: the structure of the economy under consideration, and the
instrumentsof policy which the governmentcan (orcannot) employ. We have
workedwith a simple dualeconomymodel, while ensuring an adequate re-
presentationof individuals' incentives. The terms of trade is the instrument
of control on which we have focussed, although we have discussed a number of
alternative ways in which the same control problem can be characterized. It
is always possible to include additional, instruments in an analysis, but one
needs to exercise some care in doing so.
Take the example of the policy debates in the Soviet Union in the 1920's.
A number of instruments of policy, other than the terms of trade, were brought
up in these debates; among them were quantity controls, credit policy, foreign
trade and borrowing, railway tariff, and printing money. It was widely
acknowledged, however, that the opportunities provided by these additional
instruments were at best quite limited, given the institutional, limitations of
the economy at that time. Further, it was also acknowledged that the in-
adequacies of the bureaucracy and the possibility of an underground economy
were quite serious, and that these features should be considered in using any
instrument which required a direct control of quantities.23
The institutional constraints faced by many developing countries today
are no less restrictive, probably much more so, than those faced by the early
Soviet state. For such countries, therefore, it is desirable to focus on the
instruments like the terms of trade, which are less difficult to implement.
In developing economies with relatively greater institutional
capabilities, however, many instruments of policy have been used which are
relevant to the town—versus—country considerations. Among the instruments
—27—which need to be examined are: agricultural marketing boards and internal tax
borders whichexercisesome regional control over prices andcan tax the
marketed surplus, and non—price methods for the distribution of food in urban
areas24'25
IX, CONCLUSION
The problem of price scissors has remained a controversial issue ever
since the Soviet leadership debated it in the 1920's. Also, it is a topic of
substantial importance in imich of today's developing world. Our analysis of
the problem shows that some of the received wisdom on this issue is correct,
while some of it is not correct. We conclude that the rate of accumulation in
a socialist economy can indeed be increased by imposing a price squeeze on the
rural sector. But, a price squeeze on the peasants leads to a decrease in the
welfare of industrial workers, just as it leads to a decrease in the welfare
of the peasants. We have also identified the critical parameters which
influence the impact of the terms of trade on the state's surplus, and on the
welfare of industrial workers. These parameters are the price response of the
rural surplus, and the price and the income response of the urban consumption
of.the rural good.
Ouranalysis of desirable reforms in the terms of trade yields rules
which are particularly simple to use, requiring only the knowledge of the
social weights on the incomes of workers in the two sectors and of the social
weight on investment. In many cases, the desirability of a shift in the terms
of trade can be assessed simply by looking at the intertemporal trade—off s
(ratherthan by looking at the rural—urban trade—off a).Finally, we have
analyzed the optimal terms of trade. This analysis leads to a remarkably
simple rule to determine which of the two sectors should be taxed and which
—28—should be subsidized.
We have then extended our analysis to incorporate unemployment and labor
mobility, which are critical, features of many of today's developing
economies. Using a simple model with rigid industrial wage, we show that the
optimal terms of trade will entail a subsidy to the ruralsectorand a tax on
the urban sector. Further, the corresponding level of urban employment will
be such that the urban wage will exceed the marginal product of an urban
worker.
We also discuss a number of other ways in which the present approach can
be. expanded to suit the varying economic structures and institutional
capabilities of different economies. These extensions will naturally modify
the precise form of the results obtained here. We believe, however, that the
central economic effects which we have brought out in our analysis, focussing
on the consequences of pricing policy (term. of trade) on incentives in the
rural and the urban sectors, and the general equilibrium effects of a price
change on the welfare of individuals and on accumulation, will remain valid.
—29—FOOTNOTES
1.The term 'price scissors' was used extensively in the Soviet
industrialization debate. The term denotes the relative price of the
industrial (urban) good in terms of the agricultural (rural) good. It is
interesting to note here that the diagram of the relative movements of the
retail prices of agricultural and industrial goods in the USSR, between
April 1922 and March 1924, indeed resembles a pair of scissors [Dobb
(1966, p. 164)].
2."The foundation of every division of labour ...isthe separation of town
from country. One might well say that the whole economic history of
society is summed up in the movement of this antithesis. However, for the
moment we shall not go into this" [Marx (1967, p. 472)]. Marx does not
elaborate on this issue in his later writing either.
3. For example, Bukharin (1971), Lenin (1975a, l975b), Preobrazhensky (1965),
Stalin (1954), and Trotsky (1971).
4. Preobrazhensky's verbal model consisted of a peasant sector existing side
by side with a state controlled industrial sector. This model, as Dixit
(1973, p. 325) correctly points out, can be considered a precursor of the
modern models of dual developing economies.
5. This may also explain why there has been an increasing sense of
dissatisfaction with the quantity based approach of the traditional
thoeries of economic planning. These approaches, originating in the modelof Feldman,typically ignore the rural sector entirely, which implicitly
means that the government can force the rural sector to deliver the
desired amount of food needed for the urban workers, regardless of the
amount of urban goods the rural sector receives in return.
6. A significant recent work in this area is by Lipton (1977), in which a
history of the town—versus—country ideologies is traced. Also, see Dixit
(1969), and 'Hornby (1968).
7. Individual's preferences are assumed identical in the two sectors, butthe
more general case can be easily worked out.
8. As we discuss later, this is the correct assumption to make for examining
the scissors problem. For an analysis of pricing in an open economy, see
Sah and Stiglitz (1983b).
9. We discuss other possible instrumentsofpolicy, as well as other
structures of the economy, in Section VIII.
10. "The objection that taxation on the basis of a definite price policy will
affect the wages of workers...is completely futile...Here is a numerical
example: if as a result of an appropriate price policy the working class
along with the rest of the population pays to the state industry say 50
million, the state can easily return this sum to the workers by an
increase in wages,..." [Preobrazhensky (1965, p. 112)1.
11. It is in fact possible that some governments are also ignorant of such a
constraint. If this is the case, then a government may decide to lower
the relative price of food without changing the urban wage. A natural
response to the resulting shortage of food in cities would be to introduce
an urban rationing system. In turn then, one could argue that the
recurring occurances of rationing in many economies is consistent with thekind of ignorance suggested above. In any event, a rationing system,
whether it is introduced by design or because the government is unaware of
the constraints in the economy, entails a different set of instruments
than the one on which we focus in this paper. See Sah and Stiglitz
(1983b) for further analysis.
12. Contrast this to footnote 10, which appears to suggest that the urban wage
can be arbitrarily changed along with any given change in the terms of
trade.
13. This is because ( 0. To ensure this, we are assuming that either (1)
the social welfare function is strictly concave and the marginal utility
of income is non—increasing in income, or (ii) the social welfare function
is concaveand the marginal utility of income is decreasing in income.
14.To keep our exposition uncluttered,we are ruling outa rather rare regime
inwhich81_82_6
15. Note that the focus in this paper is on determining the properties of the
optimal regime at any given point in time. An instructive and useful
extension will be to find out how the optimum policy variables as well as
the resulting welfare levels of individuals change over time. Such an
analysis of the optimal time path is beyond the scope of the present
paper.
16.Weuse (4)and (7), and also the expressions for , , and
from(2) and (5).
17. The relationship between the optimal production and pricing in public
enterprises and optimal taxation of private enterprises has been discussed
in the standard tax literature. See, for instance, Stiglitz and Dasgupta
(1971).
18. Bythe same token, the valuation of labor, i.e., the shadow wage of labor,will be influenced not only by the dependence of the two sectors through
trade and resource transfers, but also by the pricing policies of the
government. The existing literature on the shadow wage has not paid
sufficient attention to these relationships. See Sah and Stiglitz (1983a)
for a re complete analysis.
9• ...itis impossible to increase the production and collection of grain
except by improving the condition of the peasantry..." [Lenin (1975b,
p. 536)1.
20. See Lenin (1975a).
21. Bukharln, in fact, exhorted the peasants to enrich themselves.
22. Stated differently, it appears that there was unanimity on
6 > 62 )3'.But there were differences on the relative size of
61 compared to 2. It is obvious that, in the present context, the
welfare evaluations are not based on an anonymous social welfare function.
23. "Exchange is freedom to trade; it is capitalism. It is useful to usin as
much as it will help us overcome the dispersal of the small producer,and
to a certain degree combat the evils of bureaucracy" [Lenin (1975b, p.
555)1.
24. Another issue which arises repeatedly in policy discussionsis the role
and the nature of correct pricing and taxation policies in those open
developing economies which not only have the specialfeatures associated
with dualism, but which in addition face restrictions on theexternal
trade of some of thegoodsthey produce, as well as on the external
borrowing which is available to them. For an analysisof many of these
issues, see Sah and Stiglitz (1983b).
25. See Sah(1982)for a comparison of the performance of several different
non—price instruments to allocate a good within asingl sector with many
consumers.REFERENCES
Atkinson, Anthony B. and Stiglita, Joseph E., Lectures on Public Ec-noniics,
NewYork: McGraw—Hill, 1980.
Barnum, Howard N. andSquire,Lyn, A Model of an Agricultural Household,
Baltimore: The JohnsHopkinsUniversity Press, 1979.
Behrman, Jere B., Supply Response in Underdeveloped Agriculture: A Case Study
of Four Major Annual Crops in Thailand, 1937—1963, Amsterdam: North
Holland, 1968.
Bukharin, Nikolai I., Economics of the Transformation Period, New York:
Bergman Publishers, 1971.
Dixit, Avinash K., "Marketable Surplus and Dual Development," Journal of
Economic Theory, August 1969, 1, 203—219.
___________,"Modelsof Dual Economies," in James A. Mirrlees and Nicholas H.
Stern, eds., Models of Economic Growth, New York: John Wiley, 1973, 325—
352.
Dobb, Maurice, Soviet Economic Development since 1917, London: Routledge and
Kegan Paul, 1966.
Erlich, Alexander, The Soviet Industrialization Debate, Cambridge: Harvard
University Press, 1960.Harris, John and Todaro, Michael, "Migration, Unemployment, and Development,"
American Economic Review, March 1970, 60, 126—142.
Hornby, J.M., "Investment andTradePolicy in the Dual Economy," Economic
Journal, March 1968, 78, 96—107.
Lau, Lawrence 3., Lin, Wuu—Long andYotopoulos,Pan A., "The Linear
Logarithmic Expenditure System: An Application to Consumption—Leisure
Choice," Econometrica, July 1978, 46, 843—868.
Lenin, Vladimir (1975a), "Economics and Politics in the Era of the
Dictatorship of the Proletariat," in Selected Works, Vol. 3, Moscow:
Progress Publishers, 1975, 230—238.
Lenin, Vladimir (1975b), "The Tax in Kind," in Selected Works, Vol. 3,
Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1975, 526—556.
Lipton, Michael, WhyPoorPeople Stay Poor: Urban Bias in World Development,
Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1977.
Marx,Karl,Capital, Vol. 1, New York: Vintage Books, 1967.
Mitra, Ashok, Terms of Trade and Class Relations, London: PrankCass,1977.
Nove, Alec, "Introduction," in Evgeny Preobrazhensky, The New Economics,
Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1965.Peterson, Willis L., "International Farm Prices and the Social Cost of Cheap.
Food Policies," American Journal of Agricultural Economics, February 1979,
61, 12—21.
Preobrazhertsky, Evgeny, The New Economics, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1965.
Sah, Raaj Kumar,"Performanceof Coupons, Queues, and Rations in Managing
Scarcities," CADE Discussion Paper 82—48. Department of Economics,
Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania, 1982.
_________andStiglitz, Joseph E.(1983a), "Social Cost of Labor and Project
Evaluation: A General Approach," mimeo, Department of Economics,
Princeton: Princeton University, 1983.
_________and_________(1983b),"The Town, the Country, and the Rest of
World: Economics of Public Marketing Boards in Open. Developing
Economies," mimeo ,Departmentof Economics, Princeton: Princeton
University, 1983.
Schultz, Theodore W., ed., Distortions of Agricultural Incentives,
Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1978.
Stalin, Joseph, Problems of Leninism, Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1954.
Stiglitz, Joseph E.. (1982a), "The Structure of Labor Markets and Shadow
Prices in LDCs," in Richard H. Sabot, ed., Migration and the Labor Marketin Developing Countries, Boulder: Westview Press, 1982.
_____________(1982b),"Alternative Theories of Wage Determination and
Unemployment: the Efficiency Wage Model," in Mark Gersovitz et. al., eds.,
The Theory and Experience of Economic Development, London: George Allen
and Unwin, 1982.
___________andDasgupta, Partha S., "Differential Taxation, Public Goods, and
Economic Efficiency," Review of Economic Studies, April 1971, 38, 151—174.
Trotsky, Leon, 1905, New York: Random House, 1971.
Yotopoulos, Pan A. and Nugent, Jeffrey B., Economics of Development, New
York: Harper and Row, 1976.